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Continuity and Change in a Spin-Off Venture:  
The Process of Reimprinting  
  
 
Abstract   
Because new entrants very often spin off from established firms, their learning and capabilities are 
closely linked to their organizational and technological heritage. While this may provide an initial 
advantage, parental influence can generate inertia and resistance to change, unless the new company 
is able to unlearn inappropriate practices and create its unique competitive identity.  The tension 
between inheritance and search for novelty is the subject of the paper. Building on an in-depth case 
study of Acorn Computers and ARM semiconductors we present a model of intergenerational 
learning and spin-off performance. Early parental influence is followed by intense learning , 
improvisation and response to feedback from the market. This we term reimprinting, to emphasize the 
enduring competitive and organizational identity established early on by the spin-off, which in this 
case provided the basis for disruptive innovation. Focus on the parent-progeny dyad as the unit of 
analysis can reveal micro-processes that reconstitute past experience to make possible both 
continuity and innovation in the spin-off venture.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Radically innovative products and technologies are often developed and commercialized not by 
incumbent companies, but by entrepreneurial ventures. Contrary to the popular image of solo 
entrepreneurs starting from scratch and seizing venturing opportunities, many of these ventures  
trace their origin back to incumbent firms or academic institutions (Christensen, 1993; Klepper, 
2001).    
In current literature, spin-offs and spin-outs represent industry entrants that have a clear 
parental heritage (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005).1 Because spin-offs are incubated within an 
organizational setting with established routines, practice, and culture, their learning trajectory and 
capabilities are closely connected to those with those of their parents. Spin-offs may also inherit 
from their parent companies blueprints (Klepper, 2001), in the form of routines, technologies and 
capabilities that are likely to shape not only the founding process of the new venture but its long 
term behavior and success. Thus, the parent leaves a lasting stamp on its offspring’s development 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Johnson, 2007) whether its founding takes the form of the departure of 
employees (spin-off) or the breaking off of a section of the previous organization (spin-out).  
In recent years an increasing number of studies have drawn on biological analogies to describe 
the parent company and its influence on its progeny as a form of “imprinting” (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
These hold that the fate of the new entity is influenced by conditions at its founding and its initial 
characteristics. The inspiration for theories on organizational imprinting is the work of Konrad 
Lorenz (1970), who argued that imprinting in animals is irreversible. But just as organisms are not 
clones of their parents, so new ventures can differ from their parent organisation. New ventures of 
this kind need to deviate from their parents’ trajectory to establish a unique identity and become self 
                                                 
1
 While the terms ‘spin-off’ and ‘spin-out’ both refer to a new entity with origins in a previous organization, the term 
spin-out usually refers to part of an existing organization being demerged to form the kernel of a new venture, while 
spin-off is used to refer to employees leaving a former organization to start a new venture, with or without endorsement. 
(De Cleyn and Braet 2009). Since both types involve employees leaving a parent firm, we use “spin-off” as the generic 
term, although our case study was deliberately formed as a spin-out. 
  
 3
sustaining  (Klepper and Thompson, 2006). The tension between inheritance and innovation, 
between past influence and new identity, is explored in this paper.  
While the new firm’s organizational heritage may provide an initial advantage, it can also 
generate inertia and resistance to change, unless the new company is able to experiment and gain 
knowledge more consistent with its own domain. How does such an internal selection process 
unfold? How is the past assimilated as a basis for the future? How are inherited resources and 
capabilities combined to establish a unique advantage? These questions have not yet received 
adequate attention, as observed by Chatterji (2009).  
While there is extensive research linking incumbents’ initial conditions to their long-term 
performance (Cockburn et al., 2000; Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Cattani, 2005) relatively few studies 
have extended this approach to the parent-progeny dyad (Phillips, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Chatterji, 2009). Most of these studies emphasize continuity between spin-offs and parents, so that 
little is known about the micro-processes that lead to the offspring deviating from its parent’s 
trajectory and forming of a distinctive identity. We lack a more micro-level understanding of the 
organizational conditions under which inheritance processes occur. We also lack a clear 
understanding of the actual practices that are the object of such intergenerational transfer. For 
instance, in a study among Silicon Valley law firms by Phillips (2002), the transfer of capabilities and 
resources from parent to progeny is inferred from evidence on the migration of employees across 
organizations. It is however unclear which blueprints are retained and which are let go in the 
process. As Chatterji observes (2009: 201): “the existing literature…has hypothesized that spawns 
inherit technical knowledge from the parent but has rarely demonstrated it empirically”. In this 
paper we adopt a focus on the parent-progeny dyad to shed light on the selection, transfer and 
absorption of knowledge and practices from the former to the new company.  To this end we apply 
these constructs to an empirical case study, which informed our conceptualization. This is an 
inductive logic, but at the same time, key constructs derived from the literature guided our 
investigation, in an iterative inductive-deductive methodology. 
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We addressed these themes by conducting fieldwork at Acorn Computers (the parent 
company) and its spin-off Advanced RISC Machines (ARM). The choice of this setting had several 
advantages. First, both Acorn and ARM are unique in the history of European high tech industry. 
Though Acorn itself was not a commercial success and was eventually shut down, it gave rise 
directly or indirectly to more than thirty start-ups. These included ARM, which established itself as 
the most prominent European company in microprocessors design and a worldwide leader in low 
power consumption RISC-(Reduced Instruction Set Chip) based processor technologies. Given its 
long history as a highly innovative and R&D-oriented company and a breeding ground for new 
ventures, Acorn represented a rich context for evaluating the impact of a firm’s existing knowledge 
base on spin-off performance. Moreover, as a result of the initial success of Acorn during the 
eighties and the subsequent dramatic take-off of ARM in the nineties, both Acorn and ARM 
received extensive media coverage over the last two decades. This has generated a large amount of 
secondary data that we were able to use in the analysis to complement the data we collected during 
our interviews.  
Our process model of intergenerational learning and spin-off performance was inspired by the 
case evidence, in inductive mode, but informed by prior theory. This reveals how spin-off 
companies can selectively retain parental influences while developing idiosyncratic features, as a 
result of organizational learning initiated by new members of the organization  and responses to 
feedback from the changing business environment. We term the transformation that thereby occurs 
in the new venture ‘reimprinting’ because it has lasting impact and reconstitutes past experience to 
enable both continuity and change. Reimprinting in the new organization is a form of 
metamorphosis that provides the basis for evolutionary diversity. 
The paper is organized as follows. We draw on prior work and our initial observations to 
construct a preliminary conceptualization. In the methods section we summarize the research 
design, the setting, and the data. We go on to focus on the case evidence to illustrate how ARM  
capitalized on its organizational heredity while departing from the practices of its parent, Acorn 
Computers. We identify key insights from the case evidence and refine our model of parent-progeny 
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transfer and spin-off performance. We conclude by discussing the implications for theory and 
practice of the study and its limitations and identify important topics for future research. 
 
2. THEORY 
In delineating our perspective on intergenerational learning we combine literature on organizational 
imprinting and founding conditions with ideas on the role of individual agency and deliberate 
learning in shaping the evolutionary trajectories of spin-off firms. We conjecture that reflexive 
agents may critically reconsider their organizational inheritance, as Popper argued in another setting 
(Popper 1976). It is necessary to filter out unwanted practices and routines and retain only those that 
are consistent with the demands of the market environment and new objectives; this is a key part of 
the process of reimprinting.   
 
2.1. The structural imprinting hypothesis 
Originally developed by Konrad Lorenz (1970) in the field of ethological sciences, the notion of 
imprinting is based on the observation that animals’ early experience exerts a crucial and permanent 
influence on their subsequent behavioral patterns2. Lorenz’s concept is a precursor to Stinchcombe’s 
notion of organizational imprinting. Stinchcombe (1965: 155), described the significance of 
imprinting in the formation of new organizations as the remarkable stability of “certain structural 
characteristics . . . over time”. Organizations, he argued, imprint and retain characteristics they were 
born with; they are products of the philosophy of their founders, and the conditions that existed at 
the time they were conceived.  
Over the last twenty years the notion of “structural imprinting” (Stinchcombe, 1965) has been 
a major source of inspiration among organizational ecologists (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Freeman, 
1986), and scholars in the sociology of organizations (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Thornton, 1999). 
                                                 
2 One of the better known examples of imprinting is a young goose who became imprinted on Lorenz after hatching. 
This took place during the period open to imprinting because she did not see the mother goose but Lorenz. 
Subsequently she accepted Lorenz in his role as mother and followed him as young geese do, all over his institute’s 
premises. 
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This literature provides evidence of the formative influence of early choices, as well as some 
explanation of the processes that generate persistence. It holds that over time organizations sustain 
their commitment to early strategies, reinvesting their resources in employees with consonant skills; 
building sets of norms, practices and routines that promote the original vision; and refining policies 
to support the goals arising from their original strategies. Two main factors are suggested as 
accounting for the imprinting process: the initial conditions (Stinchcombe 1965; Kimberly, 1975) 
and the founders (Kimberly 1979; Schein 1983; Boeker 1988).  
Initial conditions are important because when they are founded, new ventures often choose 
organizational templates that have proven effective (Ding, forthcoming). Later they tend to maintain 
the initial model to preserve legitimacy, resulting in the survival of organizational elements even after 
the social structure that triggered these elements has disappeared (Kimberley 1979; Sydow, 
Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009). Founders’ influence occurs through the resources they deploy, and is 
based on their preferences and past experience. These resources, which include position in social 
networks, competences, mental models and other characteristics of founders, provide a nascent 
organization with opportunities and constraints (Boeker 1988; Nelson 2003) which persist even after 
the founder’s departure (Hannan, Burton, and Baron, 1996).   
 
2.2. Parent-progeny imprinting and spin-off performance 
At a micro-level of analysis, a majority of new ventures arise from another firm. These new ventures  
trace their initial founding conditions to incumbent firms where they typically undergo a gestation 
period before entering the market. Spin-offs are prominent in several industries and account for a 
substantial portion of entrants. Example of industries where spin-offs are common include  
automobiles (Boschma and Wenting, 2007), lasers (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), biotechnology 
(Stuart & Sorenson, 2003), legal services (Phillips, 2002), and semi-conductors (Braun & 
MacDonald, 1978). New ventures are imprinted, or otherwise started on development trajectories, 
based on circumstances surrounding their early years.  
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Initial conditions for a spin-off - the “available social technology” (Stinchcombe 1965) - can 
be largely traced to parent-level conditions. This is most obvious for spin-outs that originate as 
divisions of another organization, but spin-offs by employees also draw on their parent 
organisation’s resources (people, technology, information, capital) in their early years and often 
undergo an incubation period before entering the market. When employees leave a parent 
organization to found a new spin-off venture, they walk out with blueprints consisting of unique 
insights and decision rules that they have developed from their previous experiences (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Klepper and Thompson, 2006). Thus, whether the influence lies in initial conditions, or 
employees transferring blueprints and heuristics, the organizational forms of the spawning firm 
shape those of its spin-off, leading to persistence of templates, technologies and structures 
developed in the parent organization. Accordingly, as pointed out by Chatterji (2009: 195): “extant 
theoretical models have predicted that spawns will look like their parents in terms of the technology 
they develop.”  
There is some empirical evidence that supports this stylized characterization. For example, in 
Klepper and Sleeper’s (2005) study of the laser industry, it is shown that nearly all the spin-offs 
initially produce a type of laser their parent had produced, thus suggesting that spin-offs exploited 
competencies inherited from their parents. Using evidence from the disk drive sector Agarwal et al. 
(2004) demonstrate that both technological and marketing know-how can be passed from parent to 
progeny. In a study of Silicon Valley’s law firms, Phillips illustrates how movements align routines 
and resources across organizations (2002). A follow-on study (Phillips 2005) confirms this 
genealogical link, showing the parent-progeny persistence of gender hierarchies that founders 
transfer from their parent firms to their new firms. Gompers et al. (2005) also shows that spin-offs 
use knowledge and practices developed in the parent firm to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.  
This view emphasizes key features and properties that originate at the parental level and are 
subsequently inherited by spin-offs with a strong causal relationship between the quality of the 
parent company and the survival of the progeny. This suggests that “healthy” parents are more likely 
to spawn healthy progeny (Agarwal et al. 2004: 505). Because spin-offs from successful parents are 
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more likely to inherit effective routines it is argued that they will perform better than other spin-offs, 
and other start-ups. As noted by Dahl and Reichenstein (2005: 17): “Spin-offs with better 
performing parents are based on better routines, which positively increases their chances of 
survival”. In contrast offspring from failing parent organizations should be less likely to succeed due 
to inheritance of faulty routines and inadequate resources, “progeny that arose in the wake of their 
parents’ failure were more likely to fail […] rather than benefiting from the failure of the parent law 
firms, progeny assume the same resources and routines that led to the failure of their parents” 
(Phillips 2002: 502). 
This literature has shed light on the continuity that characterizes the parent-progeny 
relationship, but with few exceptions (i.e. Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) it has left largely unattended 
the question of spin-offs breaking their parental mold, thereby developing their own sources of 
distinctiveness.  Continuity may well be the norm, since changing course is costly and early practices 
quickly become taken for granted (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). But a  richer theorization of 
spin-off performance should also account for parent progeny discontinuity in order to explain, for 
instance, spin-offs which are on a very different strategic and/or technological path from their 
parents and account for successful offspring originating from failing incumbents. In fact, 
discrepancies not only exist but are important. Some research, for instance, indicate that spin-off 
entry is often triggered by internal conflicts and disagreement (Klepper and Thompson 2006). For 
example, Fairchild semiconductors was floundering when it spawned some of the firms 
(“Fairchildren”) that were to establish the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley. In a recent study 
on the medical device industry Chatterji (2009) demonstrates that most new ventures do not inherit 
technical knowledge from their parent. The author concludes that other, non-technical and less 
apparent forms of knowledge shape the parent-progeny relationship. Moreover, replicating parents’ 
products is a competitive challenge and may evoke reprisals that can be avoided by developing 
complementary technologies through speciation (Garnsey, Lorenzoni and Ferriani, 2008). 
These stylized observations suggest the need for a richer theorization of the relationship 
between spin-offs’ development trajectory and their imprinted influences. The challenge is to show 
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how spin-offs establish their own idiosyncratic capabilities while at the same time building on 
parental experience. In the present analysis, a critical step was the adoption of a dyadic process-
perspective in the analysis of the spin-off. Unlike research that predicts progeny performance from 
traits of parent organizations, or alternatively examines the progeny’s performance without 
identifying parental antecedents, a dyadic perspective reveals the sequence of events as they unfold 
and shape each other.   
Our case history highlights the role of three crucial learning factors in counteracting past 
influences and contributing to the unique development of the spin-off:  (1) the role of critical events 
in triggering organizational learning and revision of the firm’s business model, (2) the role of new 
entrepreneurial agents who are able to offer new thinking on emerging opportunities, and (3) the 
role of the user environment and market feedback in shaping the strategic and technological 
direction of the spin-off.  
 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Research approach  
The conceptual ideas discussed here evolved as we moved from the study on Acorn to the study of 
ARM (and its relationship with Acorn).  This trajectory was partly intended and partly emergent. It 
started in the late 80s, when the second author became interested in the rapid growth at Acorn, a 
young technology-based company founded in Cambridge  in 1979. The focus of this research was 
on processes of organic growth and knowledge creation in innovating firms (Fleck & Garnsey, 1987; 
Garnsey & Fleck, 1988). Other issues emerging from earlier interviews and data later drew our 
attention. First, the range and depth of competence developed at Acorn made it possible for former 
members to start many local spinoffs - early examples include IQ Bio (1984), Qudos Technology 
(1985), Harlequin (1986), IXI ltd (1988), etc. Second, the entrepreneurial influence that the 
originating company had on its progeny was very strong, translating into a variety of technology 
companies drawing on know-how developed at the parental level. These observations resulted in an 
exploration of the cluster dynamics of entrepreneurial spin-offs (Garnsey & Haffernan, 2005).  
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Meanwhile in 1997 we had started an in depth study of ARM, the most successful spin-out from 
Acorn, in order to probe deeper into the parent-progeny relationship. It was at this point that we 
began to look at literature on spin-off formation (Garvin, 1983; Brittain and Freeman, 1986; 
Kelepper, 2001) and organizational inheritance (Huber, 1991; Baum and Singh, 1994). We were 
interested in better understanding the genealogical lineage linking parent to progeny. Stinchcombe’s 
notion of imprinting (1965) was especially pertinent. The idea of  reimprinting arose in relation to 
the metamorphosis of ARM, which preserved distinctive traits inherited from its parent Acorn, yet 
had its own specific and enduring traits and strategic priorities (Garnsey, Lorenzoni and Ferriani, 
2008). Interviews at Acorn, conducted in the context of the first studies, inspired the subsequent 
inquiry and provided understanding of the conditions under which intergenerational learning 
occurred. Early interviews were treated as secondary, historical evidence, in contrast with recent 
interviews at ARM conducted with the comparison in mind. Early evidence remains highly relevant 
to the comparison and has the methodological advantage of being collected in real time, free of 
retrospective bias. Table 1 provides a chronological account of these data in relation to the events 
under study for the parent and progeny company  
Table 1 here 
 
3.2.  Methodological Rationale and Evidence 
We aimed to develop process rather than variance theory: that is, we were interested in “describing 
and explaining the temporal sequence of events” involved in change (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990: 
213) rather than in identifying relationships between dependent and independent variables at points 
in time. Thus, the case study method, which involves tracing processes in their natural contexts, 
appeared most appropriate (Pettigrew, 1992). Case studies provide insight into constructs and 
relationships unobtainable without rich qualitative evidence. Siggelkow notes that “getting closer to 
constructs and being able to illustrate causal relationships more directly are among the key 
advantages of case research vis-à-vis large sample empirical work” (2007, p. 22). A single case history 
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can be justified to inform a conceptual framework and guide further inquiry.  It is not claimed that 
such a case is representative, but rather that it offers evidence of theoretical and empirical 
significance. Indeed, “… it is often desirable to choose a particular organization precisely because it 
is very special in the sense of allowing one to gain certain insights that other organizations would not 
be able to provide” (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 20).  Key contributions to management theory have been 
based on single case studies (e.g. Weick, 1995; Penrose 1960, Schein 1992).  
Qualitative research of the kind presented here draws on the inductive tradition (Van 
Maanen, 1983). Primary evidence from face-to-face interviews are particularly valuable  when they 
are from individuals who can offer understanding from their own experience. To guard against 
retrospective bias, it is however necessary to check testimonies against secondary evidence obtained 
from archives, company documents and press reports. Here case evidence was gathered through 
primary semi-structured interviews. Triangulation was then conducted through secondary and 
archival data research so the case studies drew on multiple data sources. Documentary sources 
included internal documents and press reports. We collected archival data from research literature 
and internal documents on Acorn and ARM, including yearly company reports and a detailed 
internal newsletter issued quarterly by Acorn between January 1990 and August 1993. Additional 
data were obtained from industry publications, financial analysts’ reports, and press reports about 
Acorn and ARM.  Other sources provided background information on the role of Olivetti in 
rescuing Acorn from the financial crisis that had befallen the company in the mid ‘80s (Ciborra, 
1994; Piol, 2005), on the career histories of Hermann Houser and Robin Saxby, founder of Acorn 
and CEO of ARM respectively (Langdon and Manners, 2001) and on the technological transition 
that marked ARM as providing the leading architecture in the low power consumption embedded  
processors (Atack and van Someren, 1993).  We also built extensively on contemporary evidence 
and accumulated source material on Acorn and ARM dating back to the late 80s and early 90s. We 
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used these sources to cross check interview data and control for biases in retrospective accounts of 
past events. 
In contrast with documentary records, interviews allow a greater degree of understanding of 
why events occurred and participants’ feelings about them. Over 30 interviews are drawn upon, each 
1-3 hours long, most were taped and transcribed (for details, see Tables 1 and 2). We interviewed at 
multiple levels of the organizations, often on several occasions.  Informants were from different 
functional areas and had made crucial decisions and critically shaped the genesis and development of 
the two companies. Some of them only contributed to Acorn or to ARM while others were directly 
involved throughout the gestation and spin-off. This mix provided us with personal accounts by 
individuals who experienced the process at different points in time and from different vantage 
points. Our goal during these encounters was threefold: First, we were interested in understanding 
the knowledge conditions conducive to the creation of a new company. We therefore asked 
informants questions about the general context in which research was conducted and knowledge 
managed inside Acorn. These questions helped us characterize the internal “selection environment” 
at Acorn. Second, we were interested in tracking the origins of the entrepreneurial opportunity 
leading to the foundation of ARM. Accordingly, our second set of questions dealt more specifically 
with “how” the RISC3 technology was encountered and the choices that were made in order to 
pursue it. We sought to understand the motives behind the spin-off decision and the links between 
such motives and the competencies developed at Acorn. Third, we wanted to identify ARM’s 
inheritance from Acorn and its subsequent ramifications. To this end we asked informants to 
identify the key traits of the ARM business model and technological base, and to reflect on the role 
of initial conditions and antecedents in shaping the spin-off entry process and performance. The 
interviews were structured around these general questions but allowed the interviewees choice of 
                                                 
3 A Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) chip is a microprocessor that is designed to perform only the most 
common types of computer instructions, so that it can operate at a higher speed. By using only the most common 
instructions, RISC chips can perform the majority of tasks more efficiently.  
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emphasis. Table 2 summarizes the people interviewed by role within Acorn and/or ARM and 
specific year of interview. 
Table 2 here 
This abundance of sources, repeat interviews and the opportunity to track events as they unfolded 
over time helped reduce the risk of retrospectively imposing meaning on events from knowledge of 
outcomes (Golden, 1992). The archival data were also used to guard against memory failure. Finally, 
to ensure construct validity, we shared our findings with 3 key informants (the founder of Acorn 
and two co-founders of ARM) to gain feedback and corrections from them (Seale 1999:62).  
 
3.3. Data Analysis   
We structured our methodology using a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley, 1999). This strategy 
involves decomposing the chronological data for the parent and progeny cases into successive 
discrete time periods, or phases. Phases are defined so that there is continuity in the activities within 
each period but discontinuities at their frontiers (Langley and Truax, 1994). The boundaries of the 
three chosen periods were defined either by changes in governance  structure or major changes in 
the institutional context associated with the spin-off event. As pointed out by Langley (1999 p.703): 
“Beyond its descriptive utility this type of temporal decomposition also offers interesting 
opportunities for structuring process analysis and sensemaking”  Specifically, these phases allow the 
constitution of comparative units of analysis for the exploration of theoretical ideas (Denis, Langley 
and Cazale, 1996). Within these phases data were used to describe the processes as evolving patterns 
and show how actions in one period affect action in the next (Langley, 1999). In this case, the three 
most important categories that emerged were (1) the founding context in the parent company, (2) 
the events and actions that led to the spin-off decision, and (3) the metamorphosis of the spin-off as 
it established its own identity. During analysis of the evidence, revision of the theoretical ideas, and 
iterative return to the data, these categories were refined. All the authors engaged in the analysis.  
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4. FINDINGS: ARM’S GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT  
The transition from Acorn to ARM and the underlying key events and decisions could be 
understood in terms of three sequential, partly overlapping phases. The first phase (1978 – 1985), 
coincides with the initial years at Acorn, when the company accumulated technical know-how and 
established an organizational culture strongly dedicated to technical excellence. In this period Acorn 
first came across Reduced Instruction Set (RISC)  technology and started to learn about its potential. 
This phase highlights the parental conditions for spin-off. During the second period (1986 - 1990), 
events occurred at Acorn that led to the decision to spin out the new technology and to set up a new 
venture. ARM acquired from its parent the RISC technology together with distinctive cultural traits 
and complementary resources. The crisis looming at Acorn and the arrival of new external investors 
also triggered the abandonment of inappropriate practices from the parent company and new efforts 
to learn what was consistent with the emerging strategic agenda of the founding team. During the 
third period (post 1990), ARM’s technological know-how in RISC processors was combined with 
the competencies of a new CEO coming from a different environment and with strong marketing 
experience. He had to adapt to conditions different from those envisaged for this joint ventures. 
Continuity together with new impetus shaped the emergence of a radically new intellectual property 
and partnership-based business model. This fueled new investments and innovations, and set the 
spin-off on a highly idiosyncratic competitive track. In the following section evidence is presented 
demonstrating these unfolding processes. We then reflect on this evidence to develop inductively 
(albeit informed by the literature outlined above) a process model of parent-progeny influence and 
spin-off performance.  
 
4.1. Founding conditions: Acorn Computers 
In 1978 Herman Hauser, a PhD in Physics at Cambridge University, founded CPU Ltd together 
with Chris Curry to pursue the opportunity for a low cost micro-computer that would be very 
powerful by the standards of the time. Hermann knew how to find the people who could design a 
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high performance machine rendered affordable by low overheads. Chris Curry during his years at 
Sinclair had learned the benefits to a start-up company of the mail order business model which 
required minimal capital. The novice entrepreneurs invested only £100 in their new company and in 
1979 and used the income from their design-and-build consultancy CPU to finance the development 
of a 6502-based microcomputer system. This system was launched in January 1979 as the first 
product of Acorn Computer Ltd, a trading name used by CPU to keep the risks of the two different 
lines of business separate. Acorn was at the forefront of micro-computer ideas because it was able to 
utilize expertise from the Computer Lab of the University of Cambridge.  
In 1981 Acorn was placed on the list of companies invited to tender for a BBC contract which 
would allow the selected computer to carry the BBC emblem in return for royalties. There was a 
visit from the BBC at the start of a week to look at their designs which were viewed as promising.  
Hauser succeeded in persuading a group that included Sophie Wilson and Steve Furber, to build a 
working prototype in four days, in time for the next meeting about the BBC contract. He says he did 
this by telling each of the team members that the others thought this was possible. Together they 
achieved what they individually thought to be impossible. As recalled by Steve Furber:  
“I built the first prototype by hand and Sophie looked at it and said ‘I could do better than that!’ and 
went away and did so. I thought the System 1 was entirely designed over an Easter vacation…. I do 
recall that Sophie produced the monitor program by hand (hand assembly of 6502 code), we blew it 
into a PROM and it worked straight off. There may have been a minor bug or two but basically it 
run first run, previously untested” (Electronics Weekly, 29 April 1998).  
 
The favorable report of the BBC's technical advisors and energy of the young team with its 
strong university connections led the BBC group to select Acorn's prototype as the demonstration 
model for their computer literacy series.  Acorn's reputation grew with their innovative R&D and 
high quality standards. New product design and development were a priority. Creativity was viewed 
as a strategic need, the view being that a leading company had to be ahead of its rivals on as many 
fronts as possible. In the early 1980's the company was developing products which were very new at 
the time but to become familiar ideas ten years later, including modems, other telecommunications 
products for satellite  and cable broadcasting, interactive video and an operating system to rival 
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UNIX (The Guardian, March 8, 2001). Despite Acorn’s eagerness for technical excellence, it soon 
became apparent that too many senior managers were more interested in technology than in the day-
to-day mechanics of running a business. Few projects developed into marketable products, and few 
of those produced sold well. Yet, this propensity toward experimentation and inventiveness 
remained over the years as a distinctive trait of Acorn, turning it into a power house of potential 
innovations.  
 In 1983 Acorn was growing fast and the founders sold 10% of the company on the stock 
market. In order to prevent any further delays in the launch of the Archimedes, the next generation 
computer, a group responsible for chip design was set up in late 1983 with the task of identifying 
new microprocessor designs to replace the existing 8 bit 6502. Yet none of the existing architecture 
seemed to fit with Acorn’s vision:  
“We looked at National’s 16032 and Motorola 680000 but they did not suit our design style. They 
had very complicated instruction sets giving poor interrupt response. Basically they were too slow.” 
(Herman Hauser, interview) 
 
Hauser decided to give the R&D group free rein, despite having no resources to offer them, to 
create their own 16-bit chip for the Archimedes computer. At that time, starting from scratch to 
design a 16-bit microprocessor “would simply appear insane to most of the people in the microprocessors 
business” (Herman Hauser, interview)  
Yet, the design team was enterprising enough to get themselves to the Western Design Centre 
in Phoenix and discover that other small teams were designing their own chips using early RISC 
techniques pioneered at AT&T.  
“We knew that it had taken National 200 years of development time for the 16032 and Acorn could 
not afford that – we only had 300 people at the time”, recalls Furber, “then we came across the 
Berkeley RISC. A group of graduate students had built a microprocessor with only a tiny percentage of 
the resources used by National. It was simple, it addressed the interrupt problem and it seemed 
something worth looking at” (Electronics Weekly, 29 April 1998) 
 
Once again Acorn proved it could meet extraordinary technical challenges and create new 
competencies from scratch. Whereas IBM were simulating RISC instruction sets on powerful 
mainframe computers, at Acorn, Steve Furber, Sophie Wilson and their small team of engineers 
 17
managed to designed a RISC chip using their native wit. Having limited resources and a limited 
group of people they succeeded in coming up with a highly efficient architecture which capitalized 
ingeniously on their previous core technology. As explained to us by Andy Hopper, chief 
technologist in Acorn: 
“One of the reasons it is very low power is that we had no idea how to do it … We wanted it to go into 
a plastic package because that’s much cheaper than a ceramic package and there were power limits so we 
did everything we could to minimize power. Not because we had this far sighted view that we’re going to 
be the portable products of the future.  It was small because we kept it simple. It was essentially reusable 
because we were a very small design team with no resources and we had to reuse our own core design”. 
(Herman Hauser, interview) 
 
Having learned how to build an entire computer system, Acorn had generated know-how in all 
computer specialties, including silicon chip design, operating system design, computer architecture 
and local area networking.  The first sample of Acorn’s RISC Machine,, subsequently Advanced 
RISC Machine,(ARM) was delivered in 1985 and was manufactured by VLSI which also gained the 
right to sell chips using Acorn’s new chip design. 
The ARM microprocessor emerged in a period when Acorn was experiencing financial 
difficulties. The main problem for Acorn since its inception had been increasing output to meet 
demand. The Electron model had been launched in 1983 but problems with the supply of its ULAs 
meant that Acorn was not able to capitalize on the 1983 Christmas selling period. A successful 
advertising campaign, including TV advertisements, had led to 300,000 orders but produced was 
outsourced and the suppliers were only able to supply 30,000 machines. During 1984 production 
reached its anticipated volumes, but, unexpectedly, a consumer downturn set in (Fleck and Garnsey 
1988). By January 1985 one third of the Christmas stock had remained unsold; sales were about 35% 
below the April forecast and the pressures on Acorn made it necessary to cut staff numbers from 
450 to 250 by early in 1985. Suppliers' demands for payment became pressing and by early February 
1985 a winding up petition was issued.  Acorn had to cease trading. 
 
4.2. Learning shift: Acorn crisis and spin-off decision  
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When Acorn was unable to find any British company willing and welcome to help them to sustain 
operations, Elserino Piol from Olivetti made an unexpected approach. On February 20th, 1985, after 
a short period of negotiation, Curry and Hauser signed an agreement with Olivetti giving the Italian 
computer company a 49.3% stake in Acorn for £12 million. The money went some way to covering 
Acorn's £11 million losses in the previous six months. Sales targets were agreed, which depended on 
Olivetti distributors selling Acorn stock. This did not occur. Distributors were attributing the fall in 
sales of Acorn computers to their proprietary operating system which was not compatible with the 
emerging industry standard, DOS.  When Bill Gates had offered a license on favorable terms, 
Hauser had rejected the idea of moving to an inferior operating system and a different 
microprocessor because he saw the RISC chip as the critical competence at Acorn. His foresight was 
to apply to ARM, not Acorn, where sales targets were missed over the summer of 1985, and a 
second round of refinancing was eventually implemented. In September 1985, Olivetti took 
ownership of 79% of Acorn.  They paid under £15m for the company, which had been valued at 
£100m in the previous year. 
In accordance with Olivetti's innovation policies, Acorn had originally been acquired to gain 
market share in the UK and a strong foothold in the education market. After the acquisition, both of 
these objectives lost their importance because of the very troubled financial situation of the 
company.   However, it came as a surprise to Olivetti that Acorn's labs contained a wealth of people, 
skills and on-going projects that turned out to be of strategic relevance, putting the company on a 
new track, at least as far as corporate R&D was concerned; more precisely, they envisioned for 
Olivetti the option to be a world leader in workstation technology instead of just being a follower of 
IBM (Ciborra 1994)  
The key issue in Acorn was to realize a transition from independent company to subsidiary 
and benefit from Olivetti’s international distribution network and resources. Yet, Olivetti's own 
financial performance in 1987 was disappointing and pressures on Acorn to keep out of the red 
increased. In 1988 Olivetti started pursuing several avenues to sell Acorn’s core technology:  
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“The first option was to sell it internally but Olivetti was already using Intel; then we tried to sell it to 
ST Microelectronics, but they were already linked to another chip manufacturer, then we approached 
Siemens, but they became skeptical because we were using Intel rather than ARM, at some stage we 
also approached Larry Ellison but he declined too” (Elserino Piol, personal interview).  
 
By late 1980s it became clear that the great potential of the ARM micro-processor was being stifled 
within Acorn and that integration with Olivetti’s product planning branches was not forthcoming. 
At the same time most computer companies were unwilling to buy a microprocessor that was owned 
by a competitor.   
In that period Apple was defining a new architecture for handheld devices, known as 
“Newton”, and prototyping the first products to feature this new hardware and software 
architecture. Apple believed there would be a market for the “personal digital assistant” (PDA) 
amongst the traveling business community. Having concluded that the ARM chip design was 
powerful enough to be portable, the Apple Vice President of Advanced Projects Group, Larry 
Tesler, then played a key role in initiating the launch of an independent company to develop the full 
potential of the ARM technology. John Stockton at VLSI Technology was also instrumental in 
initiating ARM’s foundation. VLSI had licensed the first RISC designs from Acorn and could see the 
potential to extend their applications. After intensive interaction by Acorn managers and Board 
members, backing for the decision to spin off ARM in 1990 was obtained from Olivetti. A joint 
venture was undertaken with VSLI and Apple Computers. The new company was now free to fully 
leverage the extensive expertise it had inherited from Acorn, where the market potential of the RISC 
microprocessor was inhibited by the many organizational and competitive pressures. As the current 
managing director Sam Wauchope explained in the wake of the spin off decision:   
“It is a bit of a wrench to separate what has been an integral part of Acorn, but we have decided that 
ARM and Acorn are best served by the creation of a separate company. The deal opens up many 
possibilities in terms of product development which we probably would not have been able to afford.” 
(personal interview). 
 
The bulk of the Advanced R&D section of Acorn that had been developing the ARM CPU 
for seven years and was composed of 12 engineers formed the basis of ARM Ltd when that 
company was founded in November 1990. Thus, at start up ARM had already benefited from 
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several years of incubation and experiments aimed at turning a generic technology (RISC) into viable 
applications through suppliers’ feedbacks and interactions between Acorn, Apple and VLSI. The 
new venture started up with the technical expertise required to design the processor. ARM’s initial 
business model involved partnership with Acorn and Apple as clients, and VLSI providing the 
manufacturing capability. The initial business idea was to replicate externally what the group had 
previously been doing in and for Acorn. However, they were now free to approach other computer 
manufacturers, who could implement the ARM core without the fear of using a component 
controlled by a competitor (Acorn Computers) who could block them out. While this seemed the 
logical and easiest avenue to pursue, ARM had also learned important lessons from the mistakes that 
led to the downfall of Acorn.  Acorn’s major problems had always been production volume and lack 
of market focus. The proliferation of promising research projects with no market follow through 
had demonstrated the crucial importance of establishing tight links with customers and listening to 
their needs before venturing into costly innovation. As ARM’s co-founder and formerly leading 
engineer at Acorn Tudor Brown pointed out: 
“Acorn was not a well run company. It didn’t pay attention to the market […] to me the most 
obvious mistakes was that creating technology by itself, even very good technology is completely useless. 
[…] It’s how you capitalize on that which makes the difference. This to me was the most important 
lesson” (personal interview). 
 
Moreover, Acorn had been insisting on maintaining proprietary systems when it was becoming 
apparent that in order to compete successfully in the computer industry, firms had to aim for 
compatibility and open standards. Attempts at exporting Acorn’s products had achieved limited 
success, and had failed in the US (Fleck and Garnsey 1988).  As ARM’s CEO noted:  
“The lesson had been learnt from failures at Acorn that, in order to succeed, a product had to succeed 
on the world stage and to do that, it had to become a global standard, which meant it had to be used 
by many companies.” (Langdon and Manners, 2001:  121).  
 
These factors suggested the need for a critical revision of strategic direction. ARM’s learning 
process benefited from these lessons, which was soon mapped onto a radically new business model.  
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4.3. Incubation and metamorphosis: The development of ARM  
With ARM established as a new company, the team set about recruiting a CEO with the right skills. 
From his 12 years career with Motorola in the US and South East Asia, Robin Saxby brought new 
kinds of experience to ARM. In addition to a mix of technical and marketing expertise, Saxby's 
infectious optimism gave the joint venture with Apple high hopes. With significant experience in the 
industry, Saxby immediately sought to gain leverage fro the company’s very limited resources. From 
his first involvement with ARM, Robin Saxby recognized the importance of managing relationships. 
Before accepting the job as managing director he arranged to meet the twelve engineers from Acorn 
to establish a rapport with them. Within the company Saxby quickly developed an open culture. He 
played an active part leading weekly management meetings and, right from the start, he involved 
everyone in ARM in identifying its strengths and weaknesses.  
Compared with the capital investment of $2-3 billion that a silicon wafer factory requires, 
ARM's resources were laughably modest. But although fabrication was clearly not an option, there 
were other ways of entering the microprocessor market. Jamie Urquhart, one of the 12 founders, 
explained how he, Saxby and other two members of the early team conducted a SWOT analysis that 
made the case for ARM to become an IP company:  
“We got everyone into one room and reviewed the options. We had already successfully licensed 
technology to VLSI. So we built on strengths we had. We also avoided weaknesses – no expertise in 
the company in the backend product/shipping logistics required in a chip business.” (personal 
interview). 
 
Other companies had already taken the IP route by becoming “fabless” chip companies 
contracting out the manufacture of their chips. ARM took this one step further and decided that 
they would be a “chipless, chip company”. As a pure intellectual property firm, ARM would license 
its chip designs to semiconductor companies. But while ARM original business plan had been to 
capitalize on its members’ consultancy expertise, licensing this technology to Acorn, Apple and 
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VLSI,  Robin Saxby ramped up this model with the strategic goal of making ARM’s RISC chip 
design a global standard.4 
Partners would take the ARM enabling technology, add their own application specific 
technology to it, and use their silicon plants to manufacture the chip. To pursue this strategy ARM 
had to develop new relational capabilities that were not in the repertoire of its founders. Given the 
scarcity of resources, rather than recruiting specialized marketing personnel, Saxby chose to promote 
three of the twelve Acorn engineers to positions of sales and marketing.  He believed that it was 
quicker and easier to teach engineers to sell than teach salesmen to understand ARM's complex 
technology. He hired a part time external consultant to train his team in sales and customer 
management. As one of the founders told us:  
This guy taught us the SPIN approach [Situation, Problem, Implication, Need-payoff] Essentially 
the first thing you do with a customer is you work out the Situation. How big is the company? How 
many chips do you design? How many chips do you manufacture? Then the P is problems.  What sort 
of problems exists? Because getting a customer to take your product, if there are no problems - it is very 
difficult […]. And they had problems because they had to design a different chip for every different 
application (it) goes into. A number of people went through that training and we were speaking a 
common language internally […] The culture was to learn and to understand, to assimilate and to see 
what works. (personal interview). 
 
The combination of deep technical know-how and a learning attitude allowed ARM to set out 
on a new developmental course in a very short span of time. In November 1991, ARM launched its 
first products, the ARM6 family of chips including the ARM600 power efficient microprocessor, at 
the Microprocessor forum in San Francisco. VLSI Technology offered to manufacture the new 
processors customized to users' requirements. During this first year of operation, ARM focused on 
its immediate source of revenue from licensing agreements. In January 1992, ARM announced that 
GEC Plessey Semiconductors (GPS) had become their first independent licensee to manufacture 
ARM chips and incorporate ARM features into application-specific microcontrollers. ARM now had 
their first independent partner with whom to work on the basis of the licensing model.  The 
                                                 
4
 As explained to us by Saxby: “To be the world standard, we had to get partners everywhere in parallel. And to get 
partners everywhere in parallel, we had to license the technology many times. That’s the order of thinking”. 
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relationship with Plessey turned out to be a source of learning opportunities. As a former Design 
Manager at Plessey (now Principal Staff Engineer at ARM) explained to us:  
“At Plessey we were looking around for a micro processing core and then […] we picked ARM […]. 
The thing that was different about ARM was that they were not just providing a core technology […]. 
They were also excellent listeners […] they were willing to learn because they knew we were on the 
same boat. So they said to us, ‘We’ve got this core. It must be useful to people for something. We don’t 
really know how you might want to use it but we’re prepared to work with you to understand it.” And 
I think it was so refreshing from our point of view because, at the same time, we knew we needed a 
core, and we didn’t know how to do it. We knew there were more questions that we knew answers to 
but didn’t know what the questions were[…] It was a teacher-student thing.” (personal interview). 
 
Saxby and his colleagues concentrated on the ‘brain’ side of the chip business”, and at the same they 
made sure their company also benefited from a deep understanding of manufacturing ‘muscle’ by 
establishing a very strong, customer-oriented approach towards its licensees.   
“We need to have an intimate understanding of the manufacturing process and work with our partners 
in areas like test, de-bug, yield and performance enhancement […] We really treat our customers as 
partners involving them in agreeing specifications and taking joint risk and benefit on projects.” 
(personal interview). 
 
Saxby also introduced a new business discipline to the group that had previously worked in the 
unstructured environment of Acorn. As one of the founders stressed:  
“He (Saxby) can be very structured…So every year, we would have business plan. We would have 
strategy review, an operational plan and a tactical plan. And these were not huge documents, but they 
were important documents.  They were important in that they built on what we had been learning. 
They aligned everybody in the right direction. They gave us focus and made us challenge what we were 
doing.” (personal interview). 
 
A strategy of frugal design and a frugal business model, focused on gaining maximum value from 
available resources to deliver the technology and nurture key relationships, proved to be very 
effective. ARM became self-sustaining by only its second year of operation, without the need for 
further financing. In 1993 Sharp became the third licensee to manufacture and market ARM 
processors. As experience increased, ARM offered further services to its clients such us consultancy, 
feasibility studies, training and prototypes supply. The extent of learning and experience that ARM 
was able to gain through these partnerships was dramatic.  
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In May 1993 when Texas Instruments took out a license ARM’s business strategy as an independent 
chip designer was endorsed by another major player. After Plessey and Sharp, this was the first 
licensee not signed up through Apple’s established contacts. TI pushed the boundaries of ARM’s 
contractual discipline further and provided additional learning opportunities: 
“TI imposed us new level of discipline. Contracts would contain all of the deliverables; they’d have all 
of the timing specified. They were very professional and it was hard. They were demanding but they 
taught us a great deal in terms of helping to regularize the set of deliverables that we would then license 
on to our licensing partners.” (James Urquhart, personal interview). 
 
At the time, TI was trying to win mobile phone business as supplier to Nokia. TI had deep 
expertise in one of the key technologies required, Digital Signal Processing (DSP), but they needed a 
CPU design that would work reliably in the background, use minimum power, and be well 
supported with design tools, models and applications. Based on this platform, they could focus on 
making a chip that was uniquely attractive to Nokia. Nokia came back with a list of problems: the 
ARM processor needed too much memory because the software code was too large, making it too 
expensive. But Nokia also recognized that there was no other product on the market that provided 
the required performance and that the solutions to these problems were not obvious. ARM was 
breaking new ground.  
In response to Nokia’s feedback ARM worked with TI to set and then meet ambitious targets 
for power consumption and code size. The outcome was a significant innovation that became 
known as the “Thumb” architectural extension. By creating a subset of the most commonly used 32-
bit instructions, ARM’s engineers found they could compress these into smaller 16-bit code without 
any reduction in performance. The endorsing effect of TI and the growing success of Nokia 
benefited ARM, attracted increasing numbers of licensees and fueled growth and innovation. After a 
decade of expansion, ARM had, by the end of 2001, 65 partners located in Europe, the US and Asia 
and about 800 employees.  Four years later it had market capitalization of £1.6 billion and with 
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ARM chips in an estimated 77% of the embedded RISC processor market, ARM’s chip design had 
become the de facto global standard.  
ARM’s new business model distinguishes it from Acorn, but at the same time the technical 
standard developed at ARM has a lineage tracing back to its parent. This interplay between 
imprinted know-how and the new organizational impetus shaped ARM’s further development.  
ARM inherited from Acorn Computers a preference for what may be called frugal design, on an 
analogy with frugal engineering, which is “…an overarching philosophy that enables a true "clean 
sheet" approach to product development. Cost discipline is an intrinsic part of the process, but 
rather than simply cutting existing costs, frugal engineering seeks to avoid needless costs in the first 
place.” (Sehgal et al. 2010.2).5  This was the hallmark of RISC chip engineering at Acorn, inherited 
by ARM, and complemented by the development at ARM of a frugal business model built around 
the licensing of IP through partnerships in order to generate maximum value from limited resources 
and to retain customers by providing design and support services. This novel business model, ,the 
outcome of choice and necessity, became the hallmark reimprinted, as it were, on ARM.  
Technology and business models which economise on resources to provide new solutions for 
customers (who are often in new market segments) based on close understanding of their needs, 
may disrupt the existing terms of competition and shift demand onto a new basis (Christensen 
1997). A form of disruptive innovation which was achieved by ARM’s technology and business 
model as the outcome of imprinting at Acorn and reimprinting early on at ARM. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Though frugal engineering is a term applied recently to technologies for bottom of pyramid markets, it is an 
approach that can be found wherever resource intensive solutions are rejected in favour of economy of design and 
materials. 
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5. A STYLIZED MODEL OF INTERGENERATIONAL LEARNING AND SPIN-OFF 
PERFORMANCE  
Our process model, illustrated in figure 1, begins with parent’s imprinted influences and ends with 
variations in the spin-off’s likelihood of developing its own idiosyncratic trajectory. The new model 
enriches previous conceptualizations of spin-out by highlighting how reimprinting takes place 
through the impact of a new set of influences on the venture that have enduring effects and modify 
(but do not erase) the influence of the initial imprinting process in the parent organisation.  
Figure 1 here 
The processes of imprinting and reimprinting roughly map onto the stages in which we have 
divided the case evidence. In stage one, the parent company develops its own distinctive blueprints. 
The culture, resources and routines that crystallize during this phase set the initial conditions under 
which the progeny is to emerge. Stage two is the gestation period that culminates with the 
emergence of the new firm. This is the stage of congenital learning and critical revision. The spin-off 
draws on parental blueprints to make sense of the external environment and rapidly set out on a 
developmental course. Yet, this can also be a phase of critical revisions as the offspring tries to 
develop its own identity and override its parental influences while selectively retaining inherited 
traits. Deviation from the parental pattern increases to the extent that the parent experiences severe 
failures or crises. Negative events serve as stimuli for the progeny to reconsider the value of its 
heritage and point to the plasticity of this process in contrast with the rigidity implied by the classic 
imprinting notion. This stage is followed by intense learning efforts whereby the spin-off establishes 
its idiosyncratic trajectory based on a blending of retained routines, input from newcomers and 
experimentation, as well as feedback from the market. The term reimprinting emphasizes the 
enduring metamorphosis experienced by the spin-off as it departs from the parent’s path and sets on 
a new and idiosyncratic track.  
 27
The three time-windows displayed in table 3 identify the salient elements distilled from these 
transition stages. We use these points to illustrate essential features of the metamorphosis from 
parent to progeny, with imprinting and reimprinting at either end of the process which unfolds 
through the intermediary stage of critical revision.   
Table 3 here 
The table suggests that while some blueprints are invariant across the two ends of the 
continuum, others disappear and new ones emerge, either as a result of the mutation of inherited 
blueprints or the creation of new ones. We saw for instance that at Acorn there was a noticeable lack 
of plans for setting a global standard. Acorn had a proprietary technology developed in-house and 
did not attempt to create an internationally accepted technology standard, in contrast to ARM where 
this strategy was prioritized from early on by Saxby and his colleagues. The parent company sold 
micro-computers to end consumers while ARM was very soon established as an Intellectual 
Property company, not producing or selling microprocessors but licensing them. Acorn’s form of 
innovation was in effect closed, despite collaboration with software houses. ARM embraced open 
innovation, gathering insights and knowledge through multiple partnerships and licensing agreement 
worldwide. Similarly, Acorn did not file a single patent during its existence, relying on non-imitable 
competence for competitive advantage, while ARM started very early to patent as a condition for the 
sustainability of its emerging business model. ARM’s ensuing know-how was not just technology-
based but encompassed a whole spectrum of customer service and support capabilities.  
The seeds of this approach can be seen in Acorn’s early relationship with VLSI and Apple, but 
were not formalized into a systematic and replicable template. Moreover, while Acorn and ARM 
were both characterized by the engagement of visionary champions who committed themselves to a 
business idea, these individuals were very dissimilar in terms of expertise and prior experience. 
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Hauser’s expertise lay in technology, while Saxby was a marketing manager whose entry brought into 
ARM a completely new marketing approach. 
 
5.1. Imprinting, critical revision and reimprinting  
The reimprinting process in a spin-off occurs through a process of selective retention of knowledge 
(Campbell, 1965). Some practices are retained while others are relinquished in the light of experience 
and new possibilities - the sounding out of new options is partly deliberate and partly serendipitous. 
At Acorn this process was triggered by the crisis which culminated in the company’s acquisition. But 
despite the pre and post acquisition turmoil, subsequent layoffs and knowledge leakages, the 
sheltering of the RISC unit remained a priority throughout this period. As one of ARM co-founders 
Tudor Brown recalled: 
“Acorn management had told Olivetti right from the start that this group had to survive while 
anything else could go…so it survived with enough of its shell through those very difficult times. It was 
protected”. (personal interview). 
 
In adverse circumstances, Acorn managed to identify and shield valuable expertise. This 
deliberate salvaging of selected technological know-how in an effective development group 
prevented the dissipation of crucial resources and created the conditions that made it possible to 
benefit from earlier mistakes. Critical reappraisal proved possible in no small part because of 
acknowledged weaknesses at Acorn. These conditions clarified the nature of threats and 
demonstrated how resources and emerging market opportunities could be better matched. The need 
to set a global standard, for instance, was recognized because Acorn’s technology had been displaced 
by an inferior dominant design – the PC with Microsoft’s operating system. This was an object 
lesson for the management team on the nature of markets for interactive products and their network 
effects (Rogers, 1995).  
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Also important in shaping the offspring’s development is the influence exerted by powerful 
new stakeholders who can shift the power structure and undo previous influences, proposing and 
authorizing novel practices. ARM was formed by joint venture  which made it necessary for Acorn 
to share influence with other major players, namely Olivetti, Apple and VLSI, lessening the extent to 
which developments were shaped by the parent organisation. The redirection of ARM’s technology 
effort from the production of a PC component to the design of low power, low consumption SoC 
(Systems-on-Chip) was steered by Apple’s needs for its forthcoming Newton handheld device. The 
founders of Acorn were not sole champions of the new venture, and participants sought new 
leadership for the joint venture. 
 Consistent with the prior literature on organizational imprinting and parental influence, our 
findings suggest that ARM inherited important blueprints that had originated in the parent company. 
But these elements were reconfigured. The inherited practices were subject to critical reappraisal and 
subsequent selection in the spin-off organization. The need for selective retention of useful 
blueprints, a basis for adaptation (Burgelman 1983; Miner, 1990, 1991), is more likely to be 
recognised  where the parent company has experienced crises, that also highlight for the new team 
what to retain and what to discard from their legacy. Critical events represent powerful learning 
stimuli, not only for gaining confidence and knowledge, but in terms of encouraging reflection on 
the past and action to prevent adverse developments from reoccurring (Cope, 2001).  
As Smilor (1997) points out, entrepreneurs “learn from what works and, more importantly, 
from what doesn’t work” (p. 344). Not all failures, however, are equally adept at enabling 
constructive learning. Sitkin (1992) refers to failures that foster learning as “intelligent failures”: 
failures that provide a basis for altering future behavior through new information. These failures are 
sufficient to require attention yet not such as to have terminal outcomes (firm exit, etc.). Intelligent 
failures can promote willingness to take risks and foster experimentation that encourage resilience 
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(Lounamaa and March, 1987). Progeny whose parents have experienced failures or near-failures 
have therefore an opportunity for critical reflection, to relinquish faulty practices and address 
uncertainties that could be disregarded by progeny of successful parents.  This may be less so in the 
case of successful parents, since previous successes are more likely to reinforce existing practices 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; McGrath, 1999). However, disagreements or crises are no less likely 
than success to initiate spin-off processes (Klepper and Thompson, 2006). 
The combination of retained and new knowledge in response to market feedback, entry of 
new top managers, and successful experimentation set the spin-off out on a new trajectory. These 
developments provided the basis for its reimprinting, which resulted in a significant change in the 
original repertoire of capabilities. In addition to the entry of Saxby as the CEO, with his distinctive 
background and strategic orientation, another early influence was the internalization of expertise 
from external consultants who trained the team in new marketing and customer relation practices. 
More crucially, interactive learning with lead clients, and with clients’ customers, provided ongoing 
feedback on how to customize and improve the technology. As one of our informants explained:  
“ARM, when it’s operating properly, should be able to assimilate information about what’s happening 
in the market much more quickly than most companies because bizarrely, it will work with hundreds 
of competitors […] not competitors to ARM, but competitors to each other and with their customers so 
that in the end it benefits from an incredible intelligence machine”. (personal interview). 
 
Thus ARM’s emerging capabilities were nurtured by what amounted to an intelligence system that 
spanned many value chains and tapped into extensive information and competencies through 
numerous partnerships with clients in different sectors. These clients were explicitly referred to as 
“teacher customers” by one of our informants. Clients imposed a rigorous work discipline in terms 
of timing and relationship management and at the same time provided useful feedback on how to 
craft highly customized services.  
ARM rapidly encoded learning from these experiments with customers (Von Hippel, 1988, 
2005) into embedded routines and collective practices. This learning effort was critical to ARM’s 
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metamorphosis. Through the ongoing feedback stemming from the emerging market for low 
consumption embedded devices and the resulting experiments, ARM’s choices converged into a new 
strategic trajectory.6 As these experiments and improvised efforts (Baker and Nelson, 2005) 
developed into consistent patterns, they became codified into routines that provided the basis for 
the venture’s new organizational make-up (Gong, Baker and Miner, 2005).   
We suggest that this process of metamorphosis is reminiscent of the process of technological 
speciation (Levinthal 1998). The spin-off shares a prior lineage with its parent, but certain traits 
become prominent as a result of exposure to the selection criteria that characterize a new niche. To 
the extent that the resources available in the new niche domain are sufficiently abundant to support 
the spin-off’s distinctive development, this process may result in a metamorphosis with dramatic 
consequences. By building on selected expertise from Acorn, while at the same time diverging from 
its parent’s strategic path, ARM developed a highly idiosyncratic combination of resources 
congruent with the selection criteria of the new market for microprocessors with low power 
consumption. Traits that were favored by the new niche environments were then incrementally 
reinforced and the market offering refined.  
Overall, this process was partly intended and partly opportunistic. On the one hand there 
were deliberate efforts on the part of managers to refine and replicate selected traits by means of 
directed actions that set ARM’s new strategic orientation very early. However, it was only through 
emergent feedback from the new market for low consumption embedded devices that this 
orientation consolidated into a strategic trajectory. This occurred through exposure to external 
selection processes and the emergence of internal selection priorities that shaped ARM’s 
                                                 
6 As a similar illustration of such a phenomenon also consider Burgelman’s account of Intel’s shift from memory 
business (Burgelman, 1994). The firm was gradually pulled by market feedback and middle managers decisions about the 
allocation of resources away from the memory business, engendering a whole new set of routines and practices. Initially 
minor efforts were reinforced and ultimately fundamentally altered the organization’s business.  
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organizational and technological path in ways that could not have been anticipated (Garud and 
Karnoe, 2001). 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We started with the idea that firms reproduce themselves in spin-offs which are imprinted with the 
traits and knowledge of the parent. Organizational imprinting literature and genealogical 
perspectives on spin-off performance suggest that parental influences exert powerful and enduring 
effects on the  developmental course of their progeny. In fact, spin-offs often share features of 
culture, organizational routines and market focus of the parent organisation. Yet unless spin-offs can 
differentiate themselves, there would be no significant variation between the organizational form of 
the parent and that of the progeny. Literature on spin-off entry, organizational imprinting, and 
learning provided important clues to sources of variation. Below we discuss them separately and 
summarize the key contributions of the study for theory and practice.  
 
6.1. Implications for theory 
These findings hold several implications for theory. First, the study contributes to the 
emerging literature on spin-off performance and pre-entry experience (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper 
and Sleeper, 2005; Phillips, 2005). Scholars in this stream have suggested that spin-offs can 
overcome liabilities of newness by building on skills, networks and capabilities learned from their 
parent companies (Philips, 2002; Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Chatterji, 2009). While this idea has 
been supported by numerous studies, very little was known about the precise nature of this learning 
process. What is it that spin-offs learn from their parents? How do they replicate patterns brought 
into the new company from the parental organization? Our evidence indicates that the parent-
progeny relationship is complex. ARM did inherit deep technical expertise, a proven technology and 
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the basic constituents of its early business model. Through the joint venture, Acorn provided ARM 
with its first semiconductor partner (VLSI) and customer (Apple). But development of the core 
capability that fueled ARM’s competitive leadership was brought about through subsequent 
interaction with customers and the leadership of a new CEO coming from a different industry and 
committed towards establishing a global standard as well as receptiveness towards rapidly emerging 
market opportunities for low power embedded applications. As pointed out by Baum and Rao 
(2004), “…we still know too little about processes leading to the emergence of new organizational 
forms, or the structure of organizational inheritance that foster their persistence and transformation 
over time” (p. 213).  These processes were illuminated by taking the parent-offspring dyad as the 
unit of analysis.  
Understanding of the intergenerational processes shaping the formation and performance of 
the new spin-off, contributes to Stinchcombe’s (1965) treatment of “imprinting”. Organizational 
scholars who have embraced the imprinting hypothesis have maintained a rather deterministic stance 
towards the influence of the founding context on the development of new organizations 
(Kimberley, 1975; Boeker, 1989; Marquis, 2003), suggesting that “what an organization knows at its 
birth will determine what it searches for, what it experiences and how it interprets what it 
encounters” (Huber, 1991: 91). In contrast, we have shown the existence of internal selection 
processes in the new venture that are sufficiently autonomous to assimilate certain inherited 
elements but not others. Unlike genetic determination, replication in organizations can be modified 
by proactive individuals when entry into a new market setting and correspondingly new business 
models are required. These actors negotiate with internal and external constituencies in order to 
selectively defend their legacy and cope with the demands of a changing environment where 
previous practices are no longer appropriate. By doing so they can counteract inherited practices and 
devise novel organizational forms conducive to new business strategies and consistent with their 
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own personal values (Burton, 2001). We have also suggested that crisis in the parent organization 
may set off these processes and give rise to more plastic mechanisms than implied by most 
proponents of the imprinting effect (Johnson, 2007). In this respect our findings resonate with 
Chatterji’s (2009) recent study on the medical device industry where, using large sample statistical 
evidence, the author suggests that spin-offs only acquire certain forms of knowledge from their 
parent. But detailed evidence from rich case material is needed to reveal selective micro-processes 
that underlie the intergenerational influence leading to “… a reconstitution and transformation of 
the past in such a way that continuity and change are both preserved in the act of path creation” 
(Garud and Karnoe (2001.26).   
Finally, the research design has implications for empirical work on spin-offs and technological 
entrepreneurship. It is well known that spin-offs have given birth to major innovations (Christensen, 
1997), yet much less is known in terms of the antecedents and processes underlying the emergence 
of such technologies. The prevailing tendency to look at the parent company and the spin-off as two 
separate entities obscures the complex interplay of intended and coincidental occurrences that may 
characterize the migration path from one company to the other. In addressing this shortcoming, the 
paper illustrates the benefits of focusing on the parent-progeny dyad as the appropriate unit of 
analysis to identify micro-processes that would otherwise go unnoticed. For instance, the adoption 
of a dyadic perspective was crucial for appreciating the long span of incubation of ARM technology 
in Acorn. Indeed, the project of building a new microprocessor started at Acorn in the early 1980s 
and the team dedicated to the RISC technology had ten years to experiment, work with prototypes, 
and improve their designs for Acorn’s computer products before spinning off. By tracing the spin-
off’s heritage back to its parent company we were able to illuminates the role of antecedents in 
incubating a new technology and shaping its trajectory, tracing reciprocal influences at work. In sum, 
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the dyad as unit of analysis can contribute to our understanding of reproductive processes and 
critical change in organizational histories (Larson, 1992; Granovetter, 1995).  
Could a dyadic account have been derived from a simpler, more stylized product life cycle 
approach as found, for instance, in work by Klepper and associates (Klepper, 1997; Klepper and 
Graddy, 1990, Klepper and Simons, 1997)?  Such an approach is certainly relevant to understanding 
the difficulties faced by Acorn and the progress achieved by ARM. Acorn had developed a 
pioneering and proprietory operating system, but as the PC industry matured, the market tipped in 
favour of IBM’s operating system (MS-DOS), eliminating firms that failed to confirm to the new 
industry standard. Acorn was just one of many early micro-computer companies to struggle in 
consequence of network effects (Fleck and Garnsey 1988).  In contrast, ARM used the RISC chip 
expertise developed at Acorn to expand with the fast growing mobile phone industry where there 
was growing demand for chips of this kind. Hence, a more stylized model could show Acorn’s 
decline to be consequent on the maturation of the PC industry and ARM’s expansion to reflect the 
growth phase of the mobile phone and embedded device market. But a conceptual framework 
viewing the experience of both companies as determined by product life cycle influences would be 
reductionist, in contrast with the scope for transformative human agency identifiable from rich 
qualitative evidence (Pettigrew, 1992). A rationale for an explanatory approach that assigns agency to 
specific individuals instead of attributing change to determinist forces is provided by complexity 
thinking (Garnsey and McGlade 2006). This shows that underlying statistical representations of the 
world: " ... is the richer, more difficult, microsocopic reality of diversity and individual subjectivity, 
which in fact provides the basis for the adaptive responses of the system and its creativity ... 
moments of instability and structural change in a system are precisely when the macroscopic average 
description breaks down.." Thus theory must encompass "... the individuals and local events within 
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the system who, cumulatively and at critical points are .... the source of diversity and change". (Allen 
1997 p 2.) 
In this case, micro processes operated whereby, for example, the difficulties faced by the new 
parent company opened new opportunities for the spin-off company. We show that it required 
proactive choices and strategies by knowledgeable agents to search for and exploit the growth 
markets into which ARM expanded. To explore these efforts is a research task which requires 
acknowledgement of complexity of causal influences at many levels, including PLC factors and 
learning processes. 
 
6.2. Implications for practice 
The study provides insight to practitioners interested in new business models and business model 
design. A business model elucidates how an organization is linked to external stakeholders, and how 
it engages in economic exchanges with them to create value for all exchange partners (Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002; Amit and Zott, 2007). ARM’s business model is an exemplar of open 
innovation characterized by high transaction intensity with customer-partners and focus on a set of 
core activities.  ARM entered as a stand-alone I.P. provider in a market already inhabited by other 
providers of RISC technology (Khazam and Mowery, 1994). Unlike extant players, however, ARM 
engaged in pure architectural design of the microprocessor’s instruction set. A ‘fabless, chipless’ chip 
company requires a novel approach to the management of intellectual property and licensing-out as 
the means of value capture. ARM’s distinctive use of patenting, licensing and cross licensing allowed 
it to navigate the rough sea of knowledge appropriation and litigation. ARM used inflow and 
outflow of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation and expand the market for external use of its 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). Yet, patenting is not the only means by which value is captured. 
Protection is enhanced by non formal mechanisms based on technology road mapping and 
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accelerating the pace of new product development. ARM’s licensing model is complemented with 
customer-oriented services that facilitate the manufacturers’ absorption of both design and 
engineering know-how. As a result, licensing royalties fuel a value system that is shared with 
customer-partners and protected by them. The intertwining of these factors generates causal 
ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) making it difficult for imitators to catch up. Moreover 
powerful customers with a stake in ARM’s chip design had an interest in opposing infringement of 
ARM’s IP. 
What is also remarkable in ARM’s case is the short span of time from founding to the 
implementation of its unique business model. The new way of doing business, free from parental 
influences, and the early internationalization of the company as provider of the global standard 
resulted from the ability to learn very quickly from lead clients and partners and internalize key 
competences (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). In the case of ARM this process occurred through a rapid 
sequence from improvisation through routinization to new capability (Gong, Baker and Miner, 
2005). Capability development represents a crucial organization-level learning process for new 
resource-constrained organizations (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Our evidence suggests that 
maintaining an open attitude towards learning and experimenting is a crucial condition for 
successfully undertaking the path from improvisation to routine-based capabilities  
Related to these themes is the issue of how to preserve and safeguard capabilities and 
knowledge with high technological and wealth creation potential but whose value cannot be fully 
anticipated ex-ante (Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Hoetker and Agrawal, 2007)). By the time the ARM 
spin-off took place, Acorn had already taken a downward turn which would eventually lead it to its 
dissolution. Had it not been for the successful spin off of ARM, an invaluable legacy of know-how 
that generated wealth and technological progress would have been lost. Thus not only was ARM 
instrumental in the redeployment of this valuable know-how into a new technological domain, but 
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the prevention of its extinction. The role of progenies in rescuing innovative knowledge from the 
downfall of their parents is an important area for future inquiry and one that has important policy 
implications   
 
6.3. Boundary conditions and future directions 
Although our empirical investigation is informed by a unique case, we believe our findings are 
relevant to tracking genealogical processes underlying the formation of new ventures. However 
there were undoubtedly particular contextual features in the business environment of the Cambridge 
cluster that affect the generality of our results. The Acorn-ARM story unfolded within the socially 
and historically unique background context of the Cambridgeshire region (Garnsey and Heffernan 
2005). The proximity to world-class University laboratories, the ongoing exposure to nearby 
technological expertise and know-how, the international visibility of Cambridge and its attractiveness 
in the eyes of potential investors and executives, all shaped the Acorn-ARM dyad in a very 
distinctive manner. It is therefore the generic processes of parent- progeny interaction that should 
be examined, with the understanding that specific manifestations will differ from case to case. Some 
of the specificities of this case were as follows.  
First, Acorn was exceptional in its culture of fostering enterprise and innovation, as testified 
by the number of technological ideas generated and companies that were spun-off to pursue those 
ideas.  Thus Acorn differed from organizations in which less flexible cultures prevail. For example, 
Sorensen (2002) shows that in ‘strong cultures’ the lack of heterogeneity in worldviews and 
assumptions within the organization leaves limited room for novel thinking.  This suggests that 
employees of parent organisations with a dominant culture are less likely to generate innovative 
entrepreneurial ideas.  Further research should examine the cultural factors in the parent company 
that affect the processes through which reimprinting occurs.  
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Second, the search for new opportunities was imposed on Acorn by resource constraints. As 
noted by Sorensen and Fassiotto, corporate pressures may hinder the willingness to invest in 
exploring alternatives; in particular “Routinization makes it more difficult for organizations to react 
to possible entrepreneurial opportunities” (forthcoming, p. 7). Accordingly, future empirical work 
could explore how procedures and systems in the parent company channel and constrain, or 
facilitate, decision-making and learning in the spin-off. 
 Third, the reimprinting of the spin-off was in no small part the result of the arrival - as CEO 
and co-founder - of an individual who had accumulated experience in a different market and 
technology domain than the parent company. Phillips (2002, pg. 502) suggested that “if 
organizational blueprints and resources travel from parent firms to progeny across generations, 
populations should become less diverse as the rate of progeny foundings increases.” This assumes 
that parent and progeny founders are drawn from the same population and knowledge pool.  If so, 
the spin-off will inherit conservative beliefs and organizational arrangements (Simons and Roberts, 
2008) rather than incentives conducive to reimprinting and change. Thus further research should 
pay particular attention to sources of variety in the form of newcomers and new ideas in inter-
generational learning and look into the creative blending of different perspectives and organizational 
blueprints .  
Finally, we have explored the parent progeny process occurring through inter-generational 
learning in two firms, but as yet such issues present challenges to quantitative, variable based 
research. A dyadic case study such as the one we present here does not claim to yield results that are 
representative of all such cases, but it does provide rich historical material “through which to 
develop and articulate theoretical approaches contributing to improved social scientific explanation” 
(Johnson 2007, p. 122). We saw that seminal contributions to management theory have been based 
on single case studies which provided insight into conceptual constructs and their relationships in a 
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generic explanatory model (Penrose 1960, Schein 1997). Insight obtained through single cases can 
subsequently be explored through multiple case studies and larger-scale quantitative analysis (Van de 
Ven and Huber, 1990). Quantitative, variable based research that lacks rich background evidence 
faces problems referred to by Ragin: “In most variable-oriented research, it is difficult to examine 
multiple conjunctural causation because researchers lack in-depth knowledge of cases and because 
their most common analytic tools cannot cope with complex causal patterns.” (Ragin 1997 p. 42).  
Instead they often have recourse to simplistic conjectures that are amenable to standard statistical 
manipulation though lacking in realism. Variable research that builds on detailed evidence from rich 
case histories is more likely to address these shortcomings and draw on relevant constructs 
appropriately operationalised as variables. Cross case comparison provides an intermediate 
methodology  leading towards this type of approach as a promising direction for future research.   
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Table 1 Data sources and chronology  
 Parent Progeny 
Year Documents Interviews Documents Interviews 
1986 X 3*   
1987 X 1*   
1988  7*   
1990 X 1*   
1991   X  
1992   X  
1993   X  
1995   X 1* 
1997    2** 
1999   X 2** 
2001  1**   
2004  3** X 3** 
2005  2** X 2** 
2006   X 4** 
2007   X 3** 
Total interviews  18  17 
* Secondary historical evidence 
** Primary evidence 
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Table 2 People interviewed by role, number of interviews and year 
 
Interviewee Role Interviews Interview year 
Hermann Hauser Co-founder, Acorn 5 1986, 1987 1988, 2004, 2005 
Andy Hopper Co-founder, Acorn 2 1988, 2005 
Chris Curry Co-founder, Acorn 1 1986 
Peter Wynn Acorn, Financial Director 1 1986 
Jeff Tansley Technology Manager, Acorn 2 1988 
Jim Merriman Chief Operating Officer, Acorn 1 1988 
Brian Long Managing Director, Acorn 3 1988 
Sam Wauchope Managing Director, Acorn 1 1990 
Clare Livingstone HRM Manager, ARM 2 1997 
David Lee Managing Director, Acorn 2 1999 
Sam Boland CEO, Acorn 1 2001 
Malcolm Bird Technology Director,  Acorn 3 2004 
Alex von Someren 
Acorn engineer, wrote  1993 ARM 
RISC Chip Programmer’s Guide  
1 2004 
James Urquhart 
VLSI Design Manager, Acorn;  
Co-founder and Chief Strategy 
Officer, ARM 
2 2006, 2007 
Robin Saxby Co-founder and CEO, ARM 3 1995, 2005, 2006 
Ian Phillips Principal Staff Engineer, ARM 2 2006, 2007 
Elserino Piol Deputy Chairman, Olivetti 2 2005, 2006 
Tudor Brown 
Principal Engineer, Acorn;  
Co-founder and Chief Technology 
Officer, ARM 
1 2007 
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Figure 1 A stylized illustration of intergenerational learning and spin-off reimprinting 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Acorn-ARM transitions stages: Imprinting-Revision-Reimprinting  
 
Imprinting (1979-1985) Critical revision (1985-1991) Reimprinting (1991-) 
 
♦ Focus on technical excellence  
♦ Core team  
♦ Core technology 
♦ Improvisational capabilities  
♦ Resource constrain – less is more 
♦ Fabless 
 
 
♣ Technology champion 
(HH) 
♣ Inward looking approach 
(solo effort) 
♣ Focus on domestic market  
♣ R&D freedom   
♣ No focus on standards 
 
 
 
• Parental crisis & buyer search  
 
• Multiple options ensue 
 
• Divergent pressures from 
external constituencies 
(Olivetti-Apple-VLSI) 
 
• Selection-retention tension  
 
Inheritance 
♦ Focus technical excellence  
♦ Core team  
♦ Core technology 
♦ Improvisational capabilities   
♦ Resource constrain – less is more 
♦ Fabless 
 
Change 
♥ Marketing champion (RS) 
♥ Learning from lead clients 
♥ Early international 
partnerships  
♥ R&D focus 
♥ Patents 
♥ IP standard 
 
 
Critical juncture Critical juncture 
Imprinting Critical revision Reimprinting 
Acorn 
(parent) 
ARM 
(progeny) 
Change in strategic and technological trajectory  
Blueprints 
